In the last few years readers interested in the topic of animal cognition have witnessed their choice of textbooks in the subject multiply considerably. This book constitutes one of the latest additions to this growing collection. It is organized in nine chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. Overall, the organization of the book follows the classical format found in many cognitive psychology textbooks whose core chapters are organized around processes such as learning, perception, abstraction, memory, reasoning and language.
Chapter 1 presents a brief historical introduction and some methodological considerations. Chapter 2 briefly introduces the issue of animal consciousness, and goes on to discuss imitation, mirror self-recognition (MSR) and Theory of Mind studies. Chapter 3 deals with learning, emphasizing the two basic learning mechanisms of Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. Chapter 4 presents information about the perceptual world of animals, and relates this to the question of how animals, mostly pigeons, use their senses for navigation. Chapter 5 covers a series of topics in which abstraction plays an important role. These topics include categorization, numerical competence, time estimation and object permanence. Chapter 6 presents information about memory, with sections on short-term and long-term memory as well as a brief discussion on implicit and explicit memory in animals. Chapter 7 covers the area of reasoning in the broad sense and includes topics such as spatial reasoning (mostly maze performance), tool use, insight, transitive inferences and analogical reasoning. Chapter 8 presents research on language and communication. Ape language studies are treated in some length, and some research on dolphins and parrots is also mentioned. This chapter also devotes some space to the natural communication of dolphins, vervet monkeys and bees. Chapter 9 closes the book with some additional comparative data on brain size and learning sets, and some concluding remarks regarding the current state of affairs in the field of animal cognition.
As indicated most chapters follow rather closely the classical organization of many cognitive psychology textbooks. The only chapter that deviates from this pattern is Chapter 2, which treats its main subject, social cognition, less well than the other chapters. Partly this can be attributed to the fact that, unlike other more established topics (e.g. learning, reasoning), social cognition is a relatively recent research area. However, the treatment of the two main topics discussed in the chapter, imitation and MSR (because Theory of Mind is treated only superficially), is uneven. Whereas the author takes great pains to criticize the MSR studies, he is uncritical of the imitation studies, especially regarding its connection with Theory of Mind skills. This leads to the somehow puzzling conclusion that Japanese quail imitation is the best evidence for Theory of Mind in nonhuman animals.
There is another sense in which this book has a classic flavour besides its organization. It does perpetuate some of the same ideas expressed 20 years ago by other authors without adding much new, although perhaps there is nothing else to add (but then I cannot explain why there are so many animal cognition textbooks coming out). For instance, one idea that will not go away is that ape language studies show nothing more than a combination of Clever Hans and learned tricks. Although some of the criticisms that the ape language studies received had some basis, additional research also showed that other criticisms were unfounded. Take for instance the issue of displaced reference (i.e. using a symbol to refer to an absent object). The author characterizes instances of displaced reference as 'extremely scarce'. However, he fails to mention the elegant studies on this topic done in the late seventies by Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978a, b) . These studies clearly showed that two chimpanzees could reliably ask for absent objects by means of symbols, or bring objects located in a different room after they had been requested to by means of symbols representing those objects. Without those studies, which in my view are amongst the best studies ever conducted in the field of ape language, the author tends to offer an incomplete and biased account of the ape language experiments.
Another resilient idea is that of the null hypothesis across species. Indeed, one of the main conclusions reached by the author in the final chapter is that even though animal cognition shows great diversity, there are no clear differences across species. This paradoxical conclusion echoes Macphail's (1987) claim that no differences can be found in the intelligence of animals, except humans. Although Macphail originally pointed out that his analysis on animal intelligence was mostly restricted to learning ability because there were no comparative studies of other skills (e.g. insight), the significance of such a restricted scope of comparison is often neglected. Sadly, today, as was true 20 years ago, there are still too few species studied, on too few tasks, and often with an incomplete picture of the cognitive mechanisms implicated in each of these tasks. However, the lack of comparative studies should not be equated with the null hypothesis. What we are missing are not the differences across species, but the data to find out whether those differences actually exist.
Finally, this text, as many of its predecessors, presents Morgan's canon as the crux of the field. Without denying the importance of cautious interpretation and parsimony, it is necessary to point out that the canon is often taken as dogma rather than as a tool to explore animal cognition. If the presence of a given skill (e.g. tool use) can be explained by trial-and-error, it is often concluded that trial-and-error must be the mechanism responsible for the appearance of such skill without investigating alternative mechanisms. Without this additional research, many of 
